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ABSTRACT
This study presents a history of the relations between the United States and 
Iran before and after the Iranian revolution of 1979, and seeks to account for 
the reasons behind deep hostility between the two countries. It gives an 
account of the Iranian revolution and examines its impact on the relations 
between the two countries. Although both countries have legitimate 
grievances against each other, misperception and misleading dispositions have 
also contributed to the enmity between Iran and the United States. The United 
States’ failure in Iran is attributed to its neglect of Iranian history, culture and 
religious orientation. The study concludes that an early dialogue between the 
United States and Iran is not conceivable; but given the realities of the 
interdependent world and the fact that the United States is a global and Iran is 
a regional power, they cannot afford to disregard each other.
ÖZET
Bu çalışma, 1979, İran devrimi öncesi ve sonrası Amerika-îran ilişkilerine 
bakmakta, iki ülke arasındaki düşmanca yaklaşımların sebeplerini araştırmaktadır. 
İran devriminin oluşumunu incelemekte ve devrimin iki ülke arasındaki ilişkileri 
nasıl etkilediğini sergilemeye çalışmaktadır. Her iki ülkenin de birbirinden 
şikayet edecek geçerli sebepleri olmasına rağmen, karşılıklı yanlış algılama, 
yanlış yönlendirebilecek kimi ön yargılar da İran ve Amerika arasındaki 
düşmanlığın artmasına katkıda bulunmuştur. Amerika’nın İran’da başarısızlığa 
uğramasının, temelde İran tarihi, kültürü ve dinsel yönelimini gözardı etmesinden 
kaynaklandığı tartışılmaktadır. Çalışmada, Amerika ile İran arsında erken bir 
diyaloğun başlamasının pek mümkün görünmediği, ancak dünya gerçekleri ile 
Amerikanın küresel, İran’ın da bölgesel bir güç olduğu gözönüne alındığında her 
iki ülkenin de birbirini yok sayamayacağı sonucuna varılmaktadır.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The relatively short history of US-Iranian relations was marked by major 
fluctuations from complete alliance to complete enmity, and ranged from 
intense involvement to attempts at extreme isolation. As a result of the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic 
government, the United States, once the savior of the country, turned into a 
satan. In order to place the contradictory nature of Iranian-US relations into a 
reasonable context, the history of the two countries’ relations needs to be 
examined. This study attempts at such an objective and tries to find out the 
historical reasons behind the deep enmity between the United States and Iran.
After World War II, the withdrawal of Great Britain from the scene of Middle 
Fiast and the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Iran led to closer relations 
between the United States and Iran. On the face of an emerging Cold War, the 
United States recognized Iran as a vitally strategic country for implementing 
its doctrine of containing the Soviet Union. Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi looked to the United States as the favorite counterweight to Anglo- 
Russian involvement in Iran and as a potential source of support.
However, the involvement of the United States together with Britain in the 
coup of 1953 against the nationalist leader, Mohammad Mossadeq, and in the 
aftermath, the repressive policies of the Shah created resentment among the 
Iranian population against the United States. Moreover, the legitimacy of the
Shah was shadowed as he was called as “the US Shah”. The fall of Mossadeq 
marked the beginning of intense US involvement in Iran and a client 
relationship between the two countries.
In the early 1960s, the Shah declared Iranian foreign policy as an independent 
national policy by which he meant normalization of relations with the Soviet 
Union and dealignment with the United States. In practice, however, neither 
of them took place and the United States continued to play an important role in 
the shaping not only of Iran’s foreign policy, but also of its domestic policy. 
The White revolution that the Shah initiated in 1963 reflected very much a 
program that the United States approved for Iran.
The Shah’s policies which were designed without taking into account the 
interests and needs of Iranian society, reflected his own priorities. Repressive 
measures he took against the opposition, and his overdependence on the 
United States prepared the ground for the popular explosion of 1979. The 
United States, choosing to conduct its relations with Iran only through Shah, 
was unable to notice the extent of the popular resentment against the regime in 
Iran, and its inconsistent policies during and after the crisis contributed to the 
consolidation of power by the clergy. The hostage crisis that started in 
November, 1979, led to a major confrontation between the fundamentalists in 
Iran and Washington. It left no room for the establishment of normal relations 
between the US and Iran.
During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States announced its neutrality, but as 
soon as the Iranians gained the upper hand in war, the US tilt towards Iraq 
became apparent. It did not even hesitate to join the war on the side of Iraq 
when the flow of oil became jeopardized in 1987. And the Irangate scandal 
has further worsened US-Iranian relations. The United States administration 
under the presidency of Reagan experienced difficult time when it became 
public that it had engaged in secret arms sale to Iranians during the war while 
it was officially trying to prevent other countries from selling arms to Iran.
After the death of Khomeini, the need for domestic reconstruction led the new 
leadership to adopt a more pragmatist line in foreign policy, fhe United 
States, on the other hand, did not give any sign of conciliation. Particularly 
after the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf crisis of 1991, it continued its efforts to 
isolate Iran, fearing that it might become powerful enough to dominate the 
Gulf, in the absence of a significant Iraqi power to counter its advance.
With the advent of Bill Clinton to the presidency, the United States 
administration initiated the policy of dual containment against Iran and Iraq. 
Yet, it has not been able to isolate Iran completely. Nor could it maintain a 
significant change either in the Iranian regime or in its way of conducting its 
foreign affairs, primarily because it could not persuade the other major trade 
partners of Iran for imposing an embargo on it.
Within the theory of international relations, this study comes closer to a realist 
approach in its inquiry of the relations between the United States and Iran. It 
deals with the actual happenings and the actions of the two sides in making an 
assessment. Nevertheless, it adopts a more critical approach and seeks the 
possibility of change in the mutual relations between the two countries. In the 
realist approach, the state is the primary unit of analysis, and the relations on 
the state level draws more attention. Beyond that, this study emphasizes the 
importance of the people behind the state and their cultural, social and 
economic systems. The international system, the states and the individuals are 
jointly considered during the analysis of events.
The study has a descriptive method in that it tries to give an insight about the 
history of the relationship of the United States and Iran. It presents a picture 
of how the relations between the two countries took shape. It also makes a 
comparative analysis and looks at the actions of the two sides in relevance to a 
certain event and does not solely reflect one side’s perspective.
A survey of the literature on the subject suggests that the story of US-Iranian 
relations before and after the Iranian Revolution is not complete. Although 
there are plenty of written material about Iran, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
and about the foreign policies of the United States and Iran, there are relatively 
few materials that deal directly with the US-Iranian relations and they are 
usually edited books. Thus, the analysis of the relations of these two countries 
required a large literature survey.
One such book that analyzes the relations of the United States and Iran and 
also the Soviet Union is an edited book by Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. 
Gasiorowski, named “Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union and the 
United States”. It brings together twelve articles of various authors, some of 
which reflect the view from Tehran; some deal with the security, military and 
political relations between the United States and Iran. James A. Bill’s well- 
informed book, “The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of US-Iranian 
Relations” gives a valuable account of the relations before and after the Iranian 
revolution till the late 1980s. Mark J. Gasiorowski’s book, “US Foreign 
Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran” examines Iranian cliental 
relationship with the United States and therefore contributes to an 
understanding of the origin of the Iranian revolution of 1979.
Apart from books dealing with the United States-Iranian relations specifically, 
some deal with the foreign policy of the United States towards the Middle East 
or the foreign policy of Iran and naturally reserve a significant place to their 
mutual relations. One example is “The United States and the Middle East: A 
Search for New Perspectives”, edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi. The book 
presents a critical analysis of US Middle East policy and specifies a section for 
US policy towards Iran and the Irangate scandal. Another example of this 
kind is the book written by Afrasiabi which is named as “After Khomeini:
New Directions in Iran’s Foreign Policy”. It focuses on the Iranian foreign 
policy in the post-Khomeini era and demonstrates how the new leadership in
Iran has tried to redefine its mandate in the aftermath of Khomeini’s death. 
Another interesting point about this book is its theoretical sophistication. Its 
author presents it as the first book to oi'fer a post-positivist critical theory of a 
country’s foreign policy. In his book “ The Making of Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution: From Monarch to Islamic Revolution”, Dr. Mohsen M. Milani 
offers an analysis of the causes and consequences of Iran’s Islamic Revolution 
and also of the foreign policy of Iran after Second World War. It covers the 
domestic and foreign policy challenges facing Iran in the post-Cold War era.
The contemporary US-Iranian relations, especially the containment policy of 
the United States against Iran is discussed more in journals and in the articles 
of experts on Iran. Particularly the journals. Middle East Policy and the 
Middle East Journal have devoted their pages to the new developments in 
American-Iranian relations. Apart from these, other journals that deal with 
Middle East or US foreign policy, such as Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs 
have dealt with US-Iranian relations.
CHAPTER 2: THE ENCOUNTER OF THE UNITED STATES AND
IRAN
2.1 A Brief Summary of US-Iranian Relations from the end of World
War II to 1979
Following World War II, America entered into Middle East politics suddenly 
without having much knowledge about the history of the region. But US 
policy began to take shape with the Truman Doctrine of March 17, 1947 which 
announced United States as the guarantor for the independence of Greece, 
Turkey and Iran. Iran was important for America because of its strategic 
location. Iran had a long border with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the country 
had large reserves of oil, and profitable markets which altogether turned Iran 
into an indispensable country for the United States. The 1945-46 crisis 
between the Soviet Union and United States over Iranian Azerbaijan and 
Kurdistan was one of the first incidents after the end of the Second World War 
in which the Soviet Union was perceived by the American rulers as an 
expansionist force that the United States had to counter.' The Soviets were 
supporting autonomist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The Soviet 
troops backed the rebellious Tudeh Party and Tudeh-led government in the 
Azebaijan province. In December 1945, Azerbaijani leaders established an 
autonomous state with the help of the Soviet troops. The troops were 
eventually withdrawn as a result of Western pressure and firm reaction by the 
United States. The crisis ended with the withdrawal of Soviet Union in 1947 
by giving birth to a Mutual Defense Agreement between Iran and the United
States in 1950. Thus, the bipolarization of world affairs following World War 
II, in addition to the aspirations of the Shah for Iran, gave way to close 
relations between the United States and Iran.
As there took place a rapproachment with Washington on the governmental 
level, new political parties with Marxist, Islamic and nationalist ideologies, 
were being formed in Iran. The Tudeh Party, with support from the Soviet 
Union, became the most organized party of the period. The second political 
force in the country was composed of conservative groups such as the 
landowners, many members of the clergy, and some Bazaar merchants. But 
the real challenge to the Shah came from Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, who 
formed the National Front in October 1949. It was a coalition of various 
groups having diverse ideological orientations, including Marxism, 
nationalism, and Islamism. The National Front was arguing for the 
nationalization of the oil industry and this nationalist sentiment quickly 
became so powerful that when the Prime Minister Hajali Razmara was 
assassinated in March 1951, the Shah had to empower Mossadeq as the prime 
minister in April 1951."
2.2. Mossadeq’s Rule and the Nationalization of Oil
The oil industry was nationalized during Mossadeq’s rule (April 1951 to 
August 1953). The National Iranian Oil Company was formed; the Shah’s 
total control over the country was eliminated, and democracy began to
prosper. In general, the Western powers did not support Mossadeq as he 
nationalized an industry which was entirely under the control of the West. In 
the beginning of his rule, Mossadeq enjoyed some support from the Truman 
administration. The influence of some US oil companies that had a stake in 
Iranian oil probably affected this attitude among other considerations. But the 
US attempts failed, for Mossadeq wanted nothing short of full control over 
Iranian oil. Britain also tried all the possible instruments to undermine 
Mossadeq and his plan to nationalize the oil industry: Britain boycotted 
Iranian oil, threatened to use military force, imposed economic sanctions but 
could not manage to change Mossadeq’s mind. In the Iranians’ view, Britain 
was not only exploiting a valuable resource, but also the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company was believed to have a well-developed relationship with the 
traditional forces in the country -landowners, tribal leaders, conservative 
religious leaders and the Iranian court. Diplomatic relations between Iran and 
Britain were severed in August 1952. Mossadeq was honored for having 
defeated a strong foreign power.
Despite this so called success, Mossadeq began to lose power. Inside the 
country, he faced the opposition of the Tudeh party. Besides, there were huge 
economic problems. The volume of foreign trade diminished as a result of the 
economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the West and their boycott of Iranian 
oil. The popular support that Mossadeq enjoyed was decreasing due to the 
severe economic conditions. Mossadeq also faced difficulties within the
National Front. There were internal divisions that threatened his power and 
legitimacy.^
The real threat, however, came from Mossadeq’s foreign enemies, particularly 
the United States. American policy as it evolved in the late 1940s and early 
1950s contained three vital objectives in the Middle East." The first and the 
central concern of America was the containment of the perceived Soviet threat. 
Containment of the Soviet Union required the free flow of oil from the Middle 
East to Western industry so that the West presumably would have the 
capability to meet the challenge from the Soviet Union. The oil had an 
indirectly strategic, but a directly economic impact on the United States and 
Western Europe. A steady source of oil was essential for a healthy Western 
industry. The other objective was not very closely related with the other two 
objectives but was a major policy concern for the American government. It 
was the independence and security of the state of Israel.
Thus, the United States had to find a way to reconcile these three primary 
objectives. But these were not objectives to be pursued easily, because, the 
Middle East was inherently not a stable area. It was in a process of rapid 
change. Any policy to be coherent and in line with these three objectives had 
to catch the speed of change in the region. The forces of rapid change were 
the forces of nationalism in Iran, as in most other countries in the Middle East 
at that period.' When the nationalists first came to power in 1951, the
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policymakers in America considered that the nationalists in Iran would be 
opposed to Soviet expansionism, thus would be a natural ally of the United 
States. But the Iranians proved to be very rigid on the matter of nationalizing 
oil. The policy of nationalization was primarily a matter that concerned Iran’s 
relations with Britain, but the US was intensely worried about the 
consequences of this policy. First, the Anglo-Iranian controversy might cause 
the disruption of flow of oil to Western European allies of the United States. 
Secondly, Iranian nationalization öf oil might provide an example for the other 
countries in the region and negatively affect US oil interest in the Persian 
Gulf. Another consequence of this policy might be the lessening of Western 
influence in the area as a result of British departure. Fourth, the US 
policymakers considered that the collapse of the Iranian economy, in a period 
of domestic political turbulence, might drive Iran to a communist coup that 
might result from increasing Tudeh influence.*
2.3. The Overthrow of Mossadeq
With the advent of the Eisenhower administration, and the prevalence of 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the United States began to change its 
policy from one of diplomacy and conciliation to intervention and 
confrontation. The US started to be involved in covert activities against the 
Mossadeq government. The US government, influenced by Britain, came to 
believe that the nationalization movement of Mossadeq would hamper 
Western interests in the Persian Gulf The US government entered into
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cooperation with Britain and the conservative Iranians for the overthrow of 
Mossadeq. The Mossadeq movement was established around secular 
constitutionalism and economic nationalism, and Iran was even willing to 
negotiate the possibilities of compensation but in the West the Mossadeq 
government was portrayed as dangerously radical, one which allowed the 
Moscow-oriented Tudeh party to flourish/ Finally, on August 19, 1953, a 
successful coup was accomplished and the nationalist movement in Iran was 
suppressed. The Iranian army, under the leadership of General Fazlollah 
Zahedi, toppled Mossadeq and called back the Shah from his temporary exile 
from Rome. The Shah named Zahedi prime minister.* The coup was 
primarily organized by the foreign powers, but it was also supported, although 
implicitly by the landlords, the wealthy merchants, a significant number of the 
ulama, and members of the top ranks in the army.
The coup of 1953 had very important consequences for Iran and for Iranian- 
American relations. The fall of Mosaddeq marked the end of a century long 
friendship between Iran and America, and a new era of US intervention and 
growing hostility for America began among the forces of Iranian nationalism. 
The Shah lost much of his political legitimacy as he was believed to have been 
saved by the United States. He was labeled as the US Shah and he carried this 
stigma until the end of his life. Furthermore, psychologically, he began to feel 
himself dependent upon Washington, and he proved to be unable to act on his 
own during a crisis. After the coup, the United States and the West in general 
took all the measures to strengthen the new regime under the Shah, and to
12
bring Iran determinedly into the Western camp. The United States lost much 
of its credibility and respect in the eyes of many Iranians. The intervention 
alienated many generations of Iranians from America and the resentment 
against the US that it created has been the first step in the rupture of Iranian- 
American relations in the 1978-79 revolution.^ The 1953 coup suppressed 
revolutionary nationalism in Iran that would burst twenty-five years later in 
quite an extreme form. It is argued that the United States could have 
supported a liberal, popular, anti-Communist and pro-Western nationalist 
leader instead of siding with the Shah.'° But the coup guaranteed access to 
cheap Iranian oil for the Western states for the next two decades. The coup 
also enabled the United States to become the hegemonic foreign power in Iran. 
Washington conducted its relations with Iran through only one man, the Shah 
who had only one real source of power in Iran, the army.
2.4. The Establishment of a Client Relationship between Iran and the US
After the 1953 coup, the US established a strong client relationship with Iran. 
According to US policymakers, the main threats for Iran and US security 
interests were the domestic political unrest and a possible invasion by the 
Soviet Union. Although the Mossadeq government was removed from office, 
the National Front’s base of support largely remained intact. The Tudeh Party 
also kept its base of support. On the contrary, the Zahedi government had 
little popular support. It would be very difficult for the new government to 
consolidate its power had it not taken harsh measures against all sources of
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opposition. Hundreds of people were arrested; newspapers were forced to 
close; government employees hired by the previous rulers were dismissed. So, 
the United States engaged in a major effort to strengthen the Zahedi 
government against these threats using diplomacy, financial aid, and covert
political action. 11
The most open measures that intended to show US support for the Zahedi 
government were a series of diplomatic initiatives. President Eisenhower sent 
a congratulating message to the Shah right after the revolution for having 
encountered the crisis successfully and Iran was welcomed for an aid request. 
Vice President Richard Nixon paid a visit to Iran in December 1953 during 
which the US officials publicly expressed their support for the Zahedi 
government. The United States also negotiated a new oil agreement with Iran 
which provided a significant revenue for the Iranian economy. An oil 
consortium was created including major Western oil companies where the 
British oil companies lost their dominance. The US companies became major 
shareholders. The terms of the agreement was signed and ratified by the 
Majles in October 1954.
In addition to these diplomatic steps, the United States granted the Zahedi 
government large amounts of economic and military assistance. In August, 
the Zahedi government requested an emergency economic aid package from 
the United States; immediately a $23.4 million and an additional of $45 
million emergency aid was provided. The US also arranged large World Bank
14
loans for Iran. These large sums of US aid promoted rapid economic growth 
for Iran and enabled spending on domestic security, social services and other 
politically beneficial matters. These helped the government consolidate its 
regime and restore order.
It is also argued that after the 1953 coup, the United States engaged in covert 
activities to strengthen the Zahedi government. The CIA contacted the pro- 
Mossadeq Qaskqa tribe in Shiraz and warned them not to stage an uprising 
against the new government. The CIA station in Tehran provided intelligence 
on Tudeh Party. Iran’s intelligence forces were trained by the CIA. A US 
expert on intelligence service was charged specifically for this duty and helped 
General Bakhtiar to establish a modern, efficient intelligence organization in 
Iran.'^ The main achievement of this organization was the detection and 
destruction of Tudeh’s military network in September 1954.
2.5. The Baghdad Pact
In addition to the measures taken by America to strengthen Iran’s new regime, 
the United States also encouraged Iran to establish security arrangements with 
other US allies in the region. The Baghdad Pact was the most important of 
these regional security arrangements, signed between Iraq and Turkey in 
February, 1955. Britain joined the alliance two weeks later, and in September 
and October, Pakistan and Iran joined respectively. Joining the Baghdad Pact 
meant for Iran that it abandoned its neutralist foreign policy and chose to ally
15
13itself with the West. Such a conception of foreign policy of course reflected
the Shah’s foreign policy; his considerations about Iranian problems and his 
formulas for their solutions.
The Baghdad Pact was primarily a defense alliance aiming to prevent a Soviet 
invasion of the Middle East. The national security of Iran was the 
fundamental concern of the Shah in the 1950s and it was inseparable from 
domestic security, which mainly came to mean the security of his regime and 
of the dynasty. According to him, the most important outside threat to 
national security was posed by Soviet expansionism and within the country it 
was posed by the Tudeh Party. In order to combat these internal and external 
threats, the Shah mainly relied on two instruments: the armed forces within 
Iran and United States in the international environment. So the attractiveness 
of the Baghdad Pact for Iran was due primarily to the fact that it was a result 
of American initiative. Although the United States did not formally join the 
pact, it contributed financially and had representatives on three of the standing 
committees.'"^
From the very beginning, the Baghdad Pact embraced many problems. Iraq’s 
decision to join the pro-Western alliance infuriated Egyptian President Nasser 
and he took steps to isolate the Iraqi government in the Arab world. The 
Soviet Union also strongly opposed the pact and denounced Iran and the other 
members of the pact. When the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in July 1958, 
The Baghdad Pact lost Baghdad. The old agreement became Central Treaty
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Organization (CENTO). CENTO had not been very popular in Iran. The 
member countries could not reach an agreement on basic military matters. In 
the mid-1960s, CENTO became an instrument for limited economic 
cooperation. With the withdrawal of Iran and Pakistan from the organization 
in March 1979, CENTO came to an end.
The Iranians were greatly disappointed when the United States chose not to 
become a member of the organization as they did not want to provoke a new 
Soviet move into the Middle East. Instead, after the Suez crisis of 1956, the 
Eisenhower administration decided to quest a congressional resolution. In 
January 1957, the president’s proposals were approved by the congress which 
came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. The doctrine authorized the 
president to employ American armed forces to protect the integrity and 
independence of any nation or group of nations in the Middle East which 
requested such aid against overt armed aggression or international 
communism. Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq announced jointly their support 
of the president’s resolution.'^
In the meantime, the relations of Iran and Israel were improving. In 1957 the 
Shah, acknowledging the importance of Israel in terms of Iran’s economic and 
security interests, sent the director of SAVAK, General Teymour Bakhtiar, to 
Israel to investigate areas of mutual cooperation between the two countries. 
After a series of meetings between the SAVAK and MOSS AD officials, the 
ground for a working relationship between the two intelligence services was
17
established.'^ By the time of the Iraqi revolution of 1958, David Ben Gurion 
proposed the establishment of a peripheral pact between Israel and Iran. The 
Shah agreed and Iran became Israel’s supplier of petroleum after the Soviet 
Union decided to end oil supplies to Israel.
The 1958 Iraqi revolution had a deep effect on Iranian foreign policy. Its 
immediate effect concerned Iranian relations with the United States. As the 
United States was not a member of the Baghdad Pact, later to be named 
CEN'fO, the Iranians sought to negotiate a bilateral defense agreement with 
the United States. But to their disappointment, the US government only 
agreed to sign an executive agreement in March 1959. The Iranian quest for 
security was doubtlessly not fully satisfied with this agreement, but at least it 
promised more economic and military aid.
2.6. The “Independent National Policy” of Iran
Since the early 1960s, the Shah described Iran’s foreign policy as an 
independent national policy. This indication was generally understood in Iran 
as the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and dealignment with 
the United States. But the facts do not support this characterization. There 
took place a normalization of relations with the Soviet Union on commercial, 
economic and technical matters but politically, tensions were reduced only 
between 1962 and 1967, only to be heightened subsequently. And 
dealignment with the United States never occurred, either practically or
18
legally. After the 1968 British decision to withdraw from the area east of 
Suez, Iranian alliance with the United States even intensified. The structure of 
decision making in foreign policy did not undergo a significant change. The 
Shah continued to play the dominant role.
In the period between the late 1950s and 1964, the United States was not as 
sympathetic as before toward Iran with regard to arms acquisition. The United 
States placed more emphasis on socioeconomic development in countries like 
Iran. With the Presidency of John F. Kennedy, the United States began to urge 
for reform in Iran to encounter the challenge of the urban middle class. In 
March 1961, the Iran analyst at the Department of State, John W. Bowling, 
listed fourteen suggestions to the Shah which became a blueprint of the Shah’s 
subsequent reforms.'^ Political unrest and upheavel was shaking Iran in the 
early 1960s. In January 1963, the Shah announced his six-point White 
Revolution. It included land reform, nationalization of forests, sale of state- 
owned enterprises to the public, a profit-sharing plan for the workers, 
women’s suffrage, and the creation of Literacy Corps. Many of the reforms 
that the Shah adopted were identical to those recommended by America. In 
order to legitimize the White Revolution, the Shah called for a national 
referendum in early 1963, and it was approved by an overwhelming majority. 
The land reform had important consequences. Although it contributed to 
political stability among the rural communities, it indirectly led to tensions in 
urban areas. The land reform also created a conflict of interest between the 
ulama and the Shah’s regime. In 1960, there were around 40.000 vaqf
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holdings that had their own lands for charitable purposes. Land reform was 
curtailing the revenues of the ulama from the va^holdings. Consequently, 
land reform marked the end of peaceful relations between the ulama and the 
Shah that was experienced since 1953. The death of the Shi’i religious leader 
Ayatollah Borujerdi intensified the opposition of the ulama against the 
government. The people among the Shi’i hierarchy who disapproved 
Borujerdi’s conciliatory and cooperative policy with the Shah now found the 
opportunity to express their objections to the government. Moreover, Iran was 
experiencing an economic depression which made life difficult for everyone.
In early 1963, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as the spokesman of the 
ulama. In his speeches he was denouncing the Shah and the corruption of his 
rule.'* Khomeini was arrested because of his July 3, 1963 speech and his 
arrest led to massive rebellions throughout the country and turned Khomeini 
into a popular religious leader. After he was freed, he continued his severe 
criticisms of the policies of the Shah, especially the United States’ perceived 
intervention in Iranian affairs. The Iranian regime, convinced that Khomeini 
could not be peacefully silenced, decided to exile him. In November 1965, he 
was forced to leave Iran for Turkey. An important result of Kennedy’s reform 
policy for Iran had been even deeper involvement of America in Iran’s internal 
affairs. Although America shared the credit for reform, it also shared the 
blame for the repression exerted by the Shah.
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2.7. The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson and Growing Anti-Americanism 
in Iran
When he became president, Lyndon Johnson had much experience related 
with Iran. His foreign policy professed almost the same principles as those of 
the Kennedy administration. It embodied both a concern for human rights and 
a commitment to use military force to secure stability in Third World countries 
that were governed by American allies. In October 1964, the Iranian Majlis 
approved a law that gave full diplomatic immunity to American military 
personnel in Iran. The US Department of Defense has been urging for such a 
contract for some time. The acceptance of such a policy represented a clear 
violation of Iranian national sovereignty. It was called in Iran the Capitulations 
Agreement.''^ Immediately, reactions throughout Iran and the Iranian 
nationalists of all kinds expressed their outrage against the government and to 
the strengthened position of the United States in Iran.
Overall, the US policy makers’ growing confidence in the Shah’s ability to 
check domestic unrest led the US to reduce military and economic aid to Iran 
sharply in the mid-1960s. Also, the US ability to pressure the Shah for further 
reforms decreased. The CIA, as well as the State Department, reduced their 
intelligence-gathering capabilities in the mid- and late 1960s. From the mid- 
1960s onward, US economic aid to Iran, close relations between the CIA and 
SAVAK and other aspects of US-Iran cliency relationship declined or ended, 
but the link between the two countries remained very strong. Iran continued to
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obtain advanced military equipment from the United States and the two 
countries continued to carry out joint security-oriented activities. The United 
States was buying large amounts of Iranian oil and was the primary trade 
partner of Iran, and the latter was buying consumer goods and other products 
from the US. The Shah maintained good relations with the Soviet Union, 
actively worked for the nonaligned movement, played a role within OPEC to 
increase the price of oil, and often condemned the United States and the West 
in this period in order to counter the impression that he was an instrument of 
the United States. Nevertheless, his image as a puppet of the US persisted 
among the public and unrest against the Shah in Iran grew. Although the 
Johnson administration praised the policies of the Shah, many Iranian students 
and nationals living in the United States were flooding the White House and 
the State Department with telegrams condemning the repression of the Shah’s 
regime.
The Johnson administration steered the American policy absolutely into a pro- 
Pahlavi course. There are several reasons for such a policy. First, although 
Johnson spoke of economic welfare, social justice and political reform, he 
believed in the importance of military might and efficacy of force, particularly 
in foreign affairs. So, he was covertly approving the repressive measures of 
the Shah. Secondly, Johnson was absorbed in the Vietnam War, and it was 
important for him that friendly Third World countries shall remain stable. 
From this aspect, Iran not only seemed to have a stable government, but was 
also one of the few Third World countries whose leader supported America’s
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Vietnam policy. In addition, the Shah was emphasizing his support for Israel, 
however subtlety.
2.8. The Path to Islamic Revolution
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Iranian state had such a high degree of autonomy 
that it managed to operate without support of the society and societal input. In 
other words, the state enabled to operate without the feedback to be provided 
by legitimate political parties, popularly elected legislatures, dr a free press.^ *^  
The society’s interests and needs were not reflected in state policies which 
merely became a tool for the Shah’s personal and arbitrary priorities. Rapid 
economic growth, wielding rigid control over domestic politics, strengthening 
Iran’s military forces, promoting Westernization and secularization (however 
weak), and rendering Iran an important actor in regional and world politics 
were among the priorities of the Shah. He opted for an autocratic model of 
development for Iran in which political participation, especially by the middle 
classes was suppressed. The few democratic institutions remaining like the 
Majles and labor unions were brought under the Shah’s control. And, he could 
not be expected to attempt to reduce inequality and poverty, democratize the 
political system or safeguard Iran’s traditional values and institutions.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah’s modernization strategy suffered from 
several shortcomings. First, the massive development projects that the Shah 
introduced led to an uneven development in the economic and political
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spheres. While the former was modernized, the nature of the latter remained 
the same. Secondly, as these strategies proved unable to break the strength of 
Iran’s traditional society, they created dualisms in the economy, cultural field 
and in modes of thinking.^' While the modern sectors of the economy were 
strengthened, the power of the bazaar was not destroyed. Secularization was 
somewhat realized, but the ulama’s power was not diminished considerably. 
Thirdly, the modernization impulse of the Shah lacked a supporting ideology 
and had a very narrow base of support. The modernization programs, the 
White Revolution, the educational and legal reforms benefited 
disproportionately a small group of urban e lite .T h e  policies of the Shah 
alienated the three fundamental traditional sections in the Iranian society -the 
bazaaris, the ulama and the landed upper class. They suffered as a result of 
Western-oriented modernization. As this alienation increasingly continued, 
the state was driven into isolation from the masses and it could only survive 
through repression and foreign support, primarily from the United States. The 
Iranian society came to such a point that the state and the ruling elite were on 
the one side and almost all the other sections were on the other. In 1975, the 
Shah abolished all the political parties and established a single party,
Rastakhiz (Resurgence) for all Iranians. Each person in Iran was requested to 
be a member of the party and the Shah announced in advance that those who 
did not want to be a part of the political order, could leave Iran.“^  For the first 
time, even nonpolitical individuals were required to publicly identify 
themselves with a royal political party. In this period, other factors such as 
international political and economic conditions, shortages of skilled manpower
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and capital also affected state policies. The enormous increase in world oil prices 
in the early 1970s enabled the Shah to pursue his priorities with less constraint.
As a result, the divergence between societal needs and state policies grew rapidly, 
leaidng to increased political unrest and eventually to revolution
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CHAPTER 3: THE BACKGROUND OF THE IRANIAN 
REVOLUTION
3.1. Revolutionary Times For Iran
In the 1970s, especially after the oil boom, United States’ perception of Iran as 
a stable regional power in the Middle East was strengthened while 
domestically, the consequences of rapid economic growth led to dissent 
towards the regime enhanced by the disproportionate allocation of increased 
oil revenue. As it decided in 1968, Britain withdrew from the Persian Gulf in 
1971; and at that period, the United States was deeply involved in Vietnam.
At such a time, both the United States and Britain were happy to see that Iran 
under the Shah was assuming the role of the policeman of the Gulf The 
United States’ major ally for pursuing the policies of containing the Soviet 
Union and ensuring stability in the Persian Gulf was Iran; simultaneously, the 
Shah was happy to see Iran taking up the role of a regional power. President 
Richard Nixon relaxed US policy towards arms sales to Iran and the military 
contracts with the United States rose dramatically from 1972 to 1973.' The 
magnitude of the Iranian purchase of American arms was an evidence of the 
intensification of Iran’s alignment with the United States. And this time the 
United States decided to provide Iran with sophisticated modern weapons. 
Iran’s willingness and ability to play the leading role in the Persian Gulf also 
coincided with Nixon Doctrine’s reliance on local powers to protect their own 
as well as American interests without the involvement of US.
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In the 1970s, Iranian oil revenues increased astronomically. This unexpected 
increase left the government with little time to design a rational economic 
program. The state’s dominant role in the economy allowed the Shah to 
pursue his own economic priorities which included promoting rapid 
industrialization, accomplishing his ambitious military and public works 
projects, and providing a relatively high standard of living for Iran’s upper and 
middle classes. These priorities were far from reflecting the interests of 
Iranian society as a whole. As a result of these policies, distortions began to 
occur in the Iranian economy. First, the growth and productivity of different 
sectors were not balanced. There was a great emphasis on industrialization to 
the detriment of the agricultural sector. In the 1970s, this sector experienced 
negative real growth. And within the industrial sector, all the development 
efforts were focused on modern products, a policy which caused stagnation in 
traditional industries." Furthermore, the industrialization program of Iran 
inclined to be capital intensive which meant that more investment projects 
could be financed if labor intensive techniques had been used. This generated 
less employment for skilled and unskilled workers and more for managers, 
engineers other white-collar workers, leading to increased social tension. 
Moreover, rapid development brought to Iran seriously large numbers of 
foreign technicians and managers, around 35.000 of whom were Americans. 
The high standard of living of these people provoked further resentment 
among the Iranian population. In the 1970s, public consumption grew rapidly, 
d'he added public expenditure on military equipment increased the import 
aecount of Iran.
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These distortions in the economy caused problems one of which was the 
extensive rural-urban migration that took place as a result of the relative 
neglect of the agricultural sector, and the attraction of employment in the 
industrial sector. Most of the newcomers were unable to find suitable jobs, 
lived under bad conditions and they constituted the urban lower class that 
became the main base of support for the radical Shi’i clergy. In the cities, 
while the income of middle and upper class Iranians was rapidly growing, the 
income of urban lower class grew all the more slowly. During the early 
seventies, dissent began to grow and spread to a broader social base. Neither 
the economic policies nor the political, social and cultural policies of the Shah 
reflected the interests and needs of the society. Not only the traditional classes 
but also the modern-educated, politically distinguished Iranians, middle-class 
nationalists and intellectuals, Marxists, secularists, Islamic modernists, writers, 
poets, journalists, university professors and students voiced their concerns for 
Iran’s national identity and independence.’ Western style consumption among 
the wealthy, widening income disparity between the rich and poor intensified 
the discontent brought about by overcrowding in the cities, high rents and land 
prices, d'he survival of the royal regime in Iran was dependent on the actions 
of the Shah only, but the Shah lacked any possibility of attracting positive 
mass political support as he failed to achieve legitimacy, be it nationalist or 
religious and as he did not allow the means through which the awakening mass 
could participate in the political process.
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3.2. Human Rights Policy of President Carter
Carter’s advent to the presidency was interpreted by some observers as a blow 
to the Shah/ The reason for this was the two goals of Carter’s foreign policy 
that were at many occasions emphasized; enhancement of human rights around 
the world and arms reduction. Each of these policies were in contradiction 
with the Shah’s own policies and aspirations; he would have to revise his 
authoritative and repressive practices and his ambitious military modernization 
program might be severely limited.^ The anti-Shah opposition in Iran greeted 
Jimmy Carter’s election to the presidency with delight. His ambition for 
working for the enhancement of human rights around the whole world was a 
sign of hope. Moreover, he was known to have identified himself with 
religious values.
In the campaign for presidency, Jimmy Carter advocated the enhancement of 
human rights around the world. This policy was formed amid the internal 
disturbance after the United States’ defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate 
scandal. The reflection of the most cherished values of American society 
such as respect for human rights, in United States’ foreign policy was a 
persistent idea in US diplomacy, but it became popular in the Congress in 
1970s. The new administration was resolute in its wish to weaken and even 
severe relations with the despotic rulers of the Third World. The 
administration carried out a selective campaign against some countries in 
which human rights were violated. Iran was one of these countries.
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The Shah, who was sensitive about his image in the international community, 
took some steps to change the bad reputation of Iran in the international arena. 
The 1977 liberalization program was a part of the Shah’s attempts to improve 
the international image of Iran. Carter’s human rights policy, undoubtedly 
affected the initiation of the reform program. The Shah was under pressure to 
liberalize his autocratic rule. But once the Carter administration took office, it 
saw the necessity to somehow balance the strategic and economic interests of 
the United States in Iran. The insistence on the respect of human rights in Iran 
was almost impossible without offending the Shah. Thus, the United States 
had difficulty in reconciling the humanitarian rhetoric of the administration 
with the US economic and military interests in Iran. As a result, the United 
States’ actual foreign policy began to diverge from its initial humanitarian 
character when it came to Iran, and the Carter administration’s Iranian policy 
turned out to be inconsistent and self-defeating.*" One reason for this was the 
deep division within the Carter administration about the policy toward Iran. 
Some argued that rapid liberalization in Iran might bring about destabilizing 
consequences, while another group within the administration considered 
liberalization as a prerequisite for the long-term stability of Iran. And when the 
revolutionary movement in Iran was at its early phases. Carter was 
preoccupied with the SAL'f II negotiations and the Camp David Accord, and 
did not worry himself much about Iran. It was clear that he was not well 
informed about the intensity and extent of opposition to the Shah.
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The liberalization policy that the Shah initiated in 1977 may be considered as 
the beginning of the mass movement that eventually overthrew the monarchy 
in Iran. Before liberalization, the organized opposition to the Shah was kept 
under the rigid control of SAVAK. The Tudeh Party lacked any effective 
organization in Iran. The National Front, The Liberation Movement were also 
under SAVAK surveillance. Fada’iyun and Mojaheddin, the two main 
guerrilla organizations, were internally divided and they were restricted to a 
small faction of the population. The main constraint that kept these groups 
inactive was the fear that SAVAK generated within Iranian society. To 
outside observers, the Shah’s regime seemed invincible as it was supported by 
the Iranian armed forces, the United States, and major European powers. Iran 
was considered to be a modernizing, stable society. But they were soon to be 
proven wrong. Behind the apparent stability was a closed society on the edge 
of explosion; there was an insecure regime whose ideas and ideals were alien 
to the society at large. Although the organized opposition in Iran was 
fragmented, it had the potential to challenge the government should an 
opportunity arise; the liberalization policy provided that opportunity.
Carter’s human rights policy and the Shah’s liberalization initiatives 
profoundly had a psychological impact, among other things.’ Both the Shah 
and the opposition changed their attitudes. On the one hand, before Carter’s 
presidency, there was a general conviction in Iran that Washington provided 
unconditional support for the Shah. On the other hand, now, the human rights 
policy of the new administration was pressuring the Shah to reform his
political system. Gradually, this new perception of US policies gained more 
acceptance among the Iranians and the opposition found a new source of life. 
Belief in the invincibility of the Shah was overcome. It was a characteristic of 
the Iranian political tradition to suspect foreign clandestine activity behind any 
significant event in Iran. The demand for the respect of human rights could be 
interpreted as United States’ disapproval of the Shah’s policies and an 
encouragement to the opposition.
Opposition to the regime in Iran began to crystallize by 1977 into a coalition 
that seemed to include four elements: The National Front, primarily consisting 
of professional classes, students; bazaar merchants; leftists of various 
orientations; and Shi’i clergy. Although these groups had little in common 
considering ideologies and political objectives, they together formed a 
negative alliance. The hatred of the Shah and his regime brought them 
together. The protest movements against the Shah began in early 1977. At 
several occasions it was observed that SAVAK forces did not intervene, which 
was perceived by the opposition as the end to the period of outright repression. 
But the most encouraging event for the opposition was demonstrations against 
the Shah and the violent confrontation between the supporters and his 
opponents in Washington, D.C. during his formal visit to the United States in 
November 1977.“ It was interpreted by the opposition as another indication 
that Washington was on its way to withdraw its absolute backing of the Shah.
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In the initial phase, the opposition movement was essentially reformist and 
nonviolent. Predominantly, the students and the secular intellectuals were 
voicing their concerns. From March 1977 to December 1978, the government 
pursued a policy of neutralizing the emerging opposition by organizing its own 
supporters through the Rastakhiz Party. Meanwhile, Washington continued to 
pressure the Shah for reforms. On the first day of 1978, President Carter 
visited Tehran and honored the Shah for maintaining an island of stability in 
one of the most troubled areas in the world.’ However, almost simultaneously 
with Carter’s visit, the reformist, poorly organized movement was spreading to 
the urban centers. More important than that, the ulama was seizing the 
leadership of the movement. Shi’ism was becoming the umbrella under which 
divergent groups came together.
The revival of Shi’ism should not have been surprising for an attentive 
observer of Iranian politics. In the previous two decades, the symptoms of the 
revival became outrageously visible. Only in Tehran, twenty-five religious 
publishing houses were founded between 1965 and 1975. The number of 
veiled women and Islamic student associations increased. A number of 
incidents in Iran increased the tension and carried the movement onto a 
revolutionary course. In early .lanuary, 1978, the Shah, encouraged by 
Carter’s public declaration of support, approved an article that attacked 
Khomeini. Thereafter, the ulama organized a mass meeting in Qom. More 
than a dozen people were killed by the police mainly because the armed forces 
had been only trained to deal with external threats and did not have the
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appropriate instruments such as tear gas, for dealing with crowds. Riots in 
other urban centers broke out after this incident. Meanwhile, the main target 
of government’s hostility. Ayatollah Khomeini, took full advantage of being in 
exile to carry out an unrelenting propaganda against the Shah. His speeches 
were broadcast in Iran’s mosques. The response of the government and Shah 
to the events in the country was inconsistent. While on the one hand, the Shah 
continued with his liberalization, on the other, he took strong actions to 
suppress the growing revolutionary movement. He was taking away with one 
hand what he had given with the other. His frequently expressed reluctance to 
use massive force against his own nationals was for the consumption of the 
foreign powers. His attitude towards the United States was paradoxical, 
because while he suspected Washington of working for his downfall, he was 
seeking guidance from Washington.
It is not very easy to identify whether President Carter and his advisers had 
any comprehensive information about what was happening in Iran, and 
whether they understood its significance. For a long time, reports from the 
American Embassy in Tehran did not indicate the magnitude of the situation 
or the possibility of the downfall of the Shah. The intelligence of CIA proved 
inadequate. In any case, any contact of the CIA with the opposition in Iran 
would be interpreted by the Shah as undermining his rule. Thus, the US 
government had to rely on the information provided by the Iranian government 
and SAVAK. Even as late as August 1978, reports from CIA stated that Iran 
was not in a revolutionary, even in a pre-Revolutionary situation. However,
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all the opposition forces in Iran were getting closer to unification. By the end 
of July 1978, the events came to such a critical point that the Shah had to 
postpone his Eastern European trip. In September 1978, martial law was 
imposed in Iran.'^ On September 8, hundreds of people were killed during the 
demonstrations on Jaleh Square. Right after the Jaleh Square massacre. 
President Carter announced his support for the Shah over Radio Tehran which 
made many Iranians believe that the United States had supported, even had 
ordered the shootings.'' And this event ended any hopes for rapproachment 
between the government and the opposition, and the moderates found 
themselves forced to take a more radical, uncompromising stand against the 
Shah’s regime. Policymakers in the US were very slow in adjusting 
themselves to the revolutionary situation in Iran. Until November 1978, just 
three months before the collapse of the Shah’s regime, the US ambassador, 
William Sullivan, advocated supporting the Shah as the best option for the 
United States.
The Shah, who had never been decisive under pressure, gave uncertain 
response to the crisis. By September 1978, it was not even certain whether a 
heavy blow on the opposition would end the protests and in any case, the Shah 
did not want to use more force and cause further bloodshed. Moreover, he was 
getting contradictory advice from his own advisers as well as from 
Washington. The Shah waited for the recommendations from Washington 
throughout the crisis but the policymakers in Washington were themselves 
divided over how to deal with the events in Iran. In October and November
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1978, nationwide strikes and street demonstrations began. In December, the 
Shah finally decided to meet with the opposition. The belated meeting with 
the National Front leader, Karim Sanjabi, did not improve the situation and 
Sanjabi wanted the Shah to leave the country, but it was refused by the Shah.'^ 
Through the end of December, the British and the American diplomats were 
also advising him to leave the country. At this juncture, the Shah looked for a 
civilian prime minister and turned to another member of the National Front, 
Shapour Bakhtiar, who accepted his proposal to become prime minister on 
condition that the Shah would hand over his authority to a Regency Council 
and leave the country for an undetermined period. The Shah left Iran on 
January 16, 1979. Thus, the price of being indecisive had been very high for 
the Shah.
As he became prime minister, Bakhtiar exerted much energy. He gave 
freedom to the press, dissolved SAVAK, but he did not have the power to 
control events on the streets. He did not want Khomeini to return to Iran as he 
feared an army coup. But Khomeini arrived in Tehran on 1 February 1979 and 
the Bakhtiar government collapsed on 11 February. Revolutionary forces took 
control and Khomeini announced the establishment of the Islamic state. The 
Iranian revolution reflected as much a nationwide opposition to the Shah’s 
foreign policy as well as to his domestic policy.'^ The opposition’s criticism 
of his foreign policy focused on his de facto alliance with the United States.
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The Western shock at the Iranian revolution was a result of misleading 
assumptions more than lack of information. The prevailing assumptions in 
social sciences about the nature and consequences of modernization in the 
Third World were, indeed ethnocentric and did not, at all instances suit the 
realities of the Third World. The basic misleading assumption, as argued by 
Milani, was that the Western model of development had universal 
applicability. But the Iranian revolution showed that what is good for United 
States and Western Europe may not always be good for the Third World; the 
United States’ failure in Iran was mainly due to the fact that it never bothered 
to concern itself with the culture, religion and history of the Iranians, instead, 
the United States preferred to conduct its relations with Iran through one man 
only. This insensitivity on the part of the United States led to bankruptcy of 
its policy in Iran.
Related with this major assumption, another assumption arose: that economic 
growth leads to stability.'"' It was considered that merely economic assistance 
would suffice to solve all the problems of the Third World countries. Another 
misleading assumption was that religion cannot be a relevant force in 
revolutionary movements. Islam as a political force was hardly discussed. 
Radical change was associated with secular ideologies such as nationalism and 
socialism. Also in Iran, the leftist and nationalist groups were considered to be 
the agents of revolutionary change, hence a tool of the Soviet Union.
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Apart from misleading assumptions, political considerations of the United 
States flawed the analysis of pre-Revolutionary Iran. Its interests in Iran led 
the United States to close its eyes to what was wrong with Iran. In order not to 
antagonize the Shah, Washington ignored negative reports about Iran. It 
depended on SAVAK for information and under the Shah, SAVAK was not a 
dependable source. The Americans only knew or wanted to know the Iran of 
the rich, of the Western-educated, of the modern factories and armed forces. 
They also acknowledged the middle-class, anti-Shah dissidents whom they 
considered to constitute a serious threat to the regime. But they disregarded 
the supposedly powerless Iran; Iran of the mosques, of the shantytowns, of the 
bazaars, of the peasants, and of the poor.
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CHAPTER 4: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF 
IRAN AND IRANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
AFTER THE REVOLUTION
4.1. The Islamic State of Iran
By January 1979, as the Shah was forced into exile, the fundamentalists in Iran 
emerged as one of the most powerful forces in the country, catching the West 
and especially the United States by surprise. The Shah's incoherent strategy 
towards the revolutionaries during the course of the revolutionary movement 
(1977-1978) contributed to their victory and helped the fundamentalists gain 
an upper hand vis-à-vis the moderates. But not only the Shah, but also the 
former ally of Iran, the United States misunderstood and mishandled the 
revolutionary movement, pursued a disconcerted policy which helped 
radicalize the revolutionary movement. The United States failed to catch up 
with the speed of the events and lagged behind the revolutionary movement. 
The US policy-makers were far from realizing the internal dimension and 
direction of the movement and lost the opportunity of helping to bring about a 
more moderate alternative. The moderate faction in the revolution (the Islamic 
and secular nationalists and the reformist ulama ) were unable by themselves 
to stand up against the radicals. The US also failed to facilitate cooperation 
between the revolutionaries and the army. The armed forces, whose integrity 
might help moderates play a leading role in the revolutionary movement in 
Iran, were disintegrated.' Moreover, there seemed to have been at least four 
different US centers of decisionmaking in the course of Iran’s revolutionary
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movement: the White House, State Department, National Security Council, 
and the US Embassy in Tehran. All these centers made incoherent judgments 
about the situation in Iran. Once the Shah was overthrown, the United States 
lost almost all its impact on Iranian politics. His exile marked the end of the 
period of US dominance in Iran (1953-1979). Unwilling to recognize 
Khomeini's leadership and the tact that the fundamentalists became the 
dominant force in Iran, the United States approached moderates in the 
transitional government, which was a delayed and consequently an unfruitful 
action. It further provoked the fundamentalists and accelerated their 
consolidation of power.
In revolutionary Iran, the interaction between domestic politics and foreign 
policy has been profound. As mentioned by a scholar, the revolution itself 
was a ‘twin revolution’, reflecting the effects of that interaction. The Shah’s 
faulty domestic politics, as well as his foreign policy, especially his policy 
towards America, promoted the revolutionary process. With the establishment 
of the Islamic Republic, basically pro-Western foreign policy of Iran changed 
to one that can be summarized by the slogan “neither East nor West” {nah 
sharq, nah gharh).^ But this slogan was interpreted differently depending on 
the faction that was ruling the country. Khomeini’s views were important in 
the conduct of Iran’s foreign policy, which can be summarized as 
independence vis-à-vis the great powers and the encouragement of Islamic 
movements in other areas.
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The foreign policy of the new regime towards the super-powers was 
influenced by its perception of their support of the dethroned Shah. The 
internal function of foreign policy was extremely important in the eyes of the 
new leadership. In order to retain the revolutionary momentum, there was a 
need for an identifiable external enemy and Iran’s attitude towards the 
superpowers was shaped in line with this consideration."* The United States 
was well-suited to perform the function of that enemy not only because of its 
close alliance with the deposed Shah, but also because Iran felt secure to know 
that America could not afford to retaliate. Furthermore, Iran could not afford 
to identify the Soviet Union as the target of its hostility, because of strategic 
and political reasons. And unlike the old regime, the new one had a different 
perception of threat: for the Islamic regime, the threat was not emanating from 
the Soviet Union, but primarily from the United States and the regional 
regimes that were in alliance with it.
Right after the collapse of the old regime, a brutal struggle for the control of 
the state began among the former allies. As mentioned before, various groups 
with different ideologies and aspirations had come together for the overthrow 
of the Shah. Thus, each of these groups were claiming to be the legitimate 
leaders of the Revolution. The Shi’i fundamentalists under Khomeini’s 
leadership came out of this power struggle as the victorious force. Khomeini 
appointed Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister of the provisional government on 
February 5, 1979. A prior objective of the government was to abolish the 
subservient alliance of the Shah’s regime with the United States, and place the
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relations of the two countries on an equal plane. The new government adopted 
a nonalignment policy. Bazargan sought to terminate America’s dominant 
influence in Iran. The first foreign minister of revolutionary Iran, Karim 
Sanjabi, based the nonalignment policy of Iran on four pillars: history, Iran’s 
geographic position, the ideals of Islam, and the principle of complete 
reciprocity in relations with other countries.^ Indeed, neither Sanjabi nor 
Bazargan had an Islamic endowment. Contrary to Khomeini, both believed 
that the nation-state should form the basis of people’s loyalty to the state.
The US government recognized Bazargan’s government and decided to 
continue regular diplomatic relations with Iran.^ ’ The United States still had 
much at stake in revolutionary Iran. Its profitable markets, its significance as 
the major oil producer, the importance of its strategic location were recognized 
by Washington. Despite this recognition, Washington did not act in line with 
its interests in Iran. The Bazargan government worked to construct strong 
bilateral relations between Iran and the United States but Washington did not 
cooperate; at least the Iranian authorities considered so. Indeed, the challenge 
of anti-Americanism in post-revolutionary Iran did not become a high policy 
concern in Washington. During the nine months of Bazargan government, the 
only issue related with Iran that received permanent attention from the Carter 
administration was whether the Shah should be admitted to the United States, 
or not.
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In spite of the basically anti-American and anti-Western posture of the 
Khomeini regime, a certain degree of normalcy was reached in Iranian- 
American relations. Although Bazargan resented Carter administration’s 
support of the Shah, he tried to pursue a nonhostile, nonalignment policy 
toward the United States. In March, 1979, Iran withdrew from CENTO.
More significantly, the Iranian-American defense agreement of 1959 was 
canceled in November. In order to overturn the years-long de facto alliance, 
the web of military relationships with the United States had to be 
reconstructed. The Iranian army needed the delivery of military spare parts 
from the United States. Khomeini also approved a program to acquire military 
spare parts.^ Still, the anti-American feeling was very high in the country. 
American imperialism was pictured as the source of many troubles in Iran. 
Among the left-wing parties and Islamic groups, there was strong opposition 
to a rapproachment with the United States and a certain degree of hostility 
toward the Bazargan government.
4.2. The Hostage Crisis
The admission of the Shah to the United States on October 22, 1979, for 
medical treatment created great resentment in Iran towards America. 
Although the personnel in Tehran embassy warned Washington that they 
might be taken hostages unless the admission of the Shah was postponed, 
Washington did not pay attention to the warning. The admission of the Shah 
altered the political atmosphere in Iran; the leftist groups emphasized that it
was impossible for Iran to preserve its independence with continuing normal 
ties with the United States.
On I November 1979, Bazargan met with Zbigniew Brzezinski in Algiers and 
presumably this was the reason behind the seizure of the US embassy. The 
personnel of the embassy were taken hostage by students on November 4, 
1979. The hostage crisis led to a major confrontation with Washington and 
the fundamentalists in Iran. It ended any hope of establishing normal relations 
between Iran and the United States. President Carter broke diplomatic 
relations with Iran on April 7, 1980 and imposed unilateral economic 
sanctions. The hostility that it generated in the United States almost 
completely obscured the constructive moves that Iran made during the crisis. 
Iran made an initiative to negotiate with the Americans and Iran’s German 
lawyers met with American lawyers on May 15, 1980 in a small town near 
Frankfurt and the negotiations that took place led to a pragmatic economic
g
solution to the international litigation.
However, religious-oriented revolutionary leaders of Iran suspected that the 
American government might be planning to restore the Shah’s regime. 
Khomeini decidedly prolonged the crisis in order to put in practice all the 
institutions of the Islamic Republic and also to force the United States to 
accept the sovereignty and independence of Iran.'  ^ By rallying the masses 
behind anti-US rhetoric, the radical faction managed to out-maneuver the 
liberals in power and took control of the state political power. With the
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support that it gave to the seizure of American hostages, the Khomeini regime 
itself isolated Iran in world affairs. This event has changed the character of the 
foreign relations of revolutionary Iran from being one of ‘defensive’ to 
‘ confrontational ’.' ^
Bazargan, who condemned the seizure as a violation of international law, 
resigned two days later and the transitional period came to an end. His 
resignation was a major victory for the militant students and fundamentalists 
and a setback for the forces of moderation and the nationalists. The principle 
of equality in relations with the United States was replaced with hostility. In 
the early phases of the crisis. President Carter’s policy was inconsistent and 
changeable. First, he approved the admission of the Shah into the United 
States, which can certainly be justified on moral and humanitarian grounds.
But then he decided to force the Shah out of the United States who was 
suffering from a terminal disease.
The revolution in Iran, and the hostage crisis afterwards affected the economic 
relations between Iran and the United States. Despite the partial control of the 
liberal elements over the government during Bazargan’s term in office, the 
volume of trade between the two countries was reduced. US exports to Iran 
reduced rather sharply (by 72%) during 1979 while US imports from Iran 
remained almost at the pre-revolutionary level." T'he hostage crisis completed 
the break of economic relations between the two countries. There was a 
period of 444 days, between November 4, 1979 to .lanuary 20, 1981, before
4.5
the hostages were released. The Carter administration imposed economic and 
diplomatic sanctions on Iran which were quite effective. During the crisis, the
country was so isolated that it had to buy food, weapons, and other objects
12from the European black market at inflated prices.
4.3. The Presidency of Bani-Sadr
Bani-Sadr was elected as the first president of the republic in January 1980. 
The period from then on until the dismissal of Bani-Sadr in June 1981 was 
marked by a power struggle between the clerics and their opponents.’^  Bani- 
Sadr engaged in a fierce and aggressive struggle to defeat the fundamentalists, 
unlike the passive strategy of Bazargan. The leadership of Bani-Sadr was not 
effective; his followers constituted the minority in the parliament and in 
practice, he was the president of the opposition.'"' During the hostage crisis, 
Bani-Sadr worked out a plan for the release of the hostages but Khomeini’s 
declaration in February that only the Majles had the authority to deal with the 
solution to the crisis terminated this plan. As a result, the hostage crisis 
moved the revolution toward radicalism, allowed the fundamentalists to 
increase their anti-American rhetoric, and to confirm their control over the 
state bureaucracy, revolutionary institutions and the armed forces. These 
developments further diminished the power of Bani-Sadr and turned him into a 
figurehead president.
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By the middle of 1980, the hostage crisis, which enabled the fundamentalists 
to consolidate their power, began to become a burden: Iran was diplomatically 
isolated, war with Iraq was approaching, and the economic sanctions imposed 
by the United States were very heavy. Thus, Iran softened its demands for the 
resolution of the crisis. The hostage crisis was resolved in January 1981 just 
as Carter was moving out of the White House and leaving his place to Reagan. 
Carter desperately needed the votes he could gain through managing the 
release of the hostages before the election day. But during the campaign, 
Reagan’s office met with emissaries of Iran in Washington and Paris and they 
promised that the Reagan administration would supply the Iranian government 
with US-made weapons and spares.'”’ Reagan won and after taking office in 
January 1981, the agreement to resolve the crisis was honored and the US 
economic sanctions against Iran were lifted. Diplomatic relations between 
Iran and the United states were not reestablished as a result of the settlement of 
the dispute, but the threat of a direct US attack upon Iran was curtailed. The 
ending of the hostage crisis also removed a major obstacle for the 
improvement of relations with other developed countries, Japan and Western
Europe. Iranian trade with these countries increased notably. 16
4.4. Iraqi Invasion of Iran
On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. The immediate cause of the war 
was the Iranian Revolution of the previous year. The universalistic, populist 
Islamic Revolution was perceived by Baghdad as posing a major threat to the
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secular ideology of the Ba’thist party and to the regime of Saddam Hussein. 
Iraq had a large Shi’i population that might be encouraged by the Islamic 
revolution in Iran. The Islamic ideology challenged the imported ideas of 
nationalism and socialism upon which the ideology of the Ba’thist regime was 
formed. Deeper causes of the war lay in the rivalry between Iran and Iraq in 
the Persian Gulf. Essentially, the Iran-Iraq war was a dispute over borders; a 
conflict about the division of the waters of Shatt al-Arab R iv e r .T h e  dispute 
seemed to have been resolved in 1975 with the signature of the Algiers 
Agreement and both countries’ observance of the treaty was satisfactory from 
1975 until the revolutionary takeover in Iran in February 1979. The new 
Iranian leadership did not seem to be interested in demonstrating diplomatic 
niceties. It neither abandoned the 1975 treaty formally, nor did it declare that it 
would go on to observe it.
Iran and Iraq were the two most powerful and populous states of the Persian 
Gulf and geopolitically they were rivals within that region. The conflict 
between the two states had a long historical background. The modern conflict 
between Saddam Hussein and Khomeini wiis at the same time a conflict 
between two religious sects (Sunni and Shi’a), two nations (Arab and Persian),
and two philosophies (radical Arab nationalism and Islamic radicalism). 18
The Iraqi decision to attack Iran rellected several thoughts: that the Iranian 
army was demoralized and disorganized after the revolution and would be 
unable to counter a severe military attack; an expectation that a speedy and a 
comprehensive defeat of Iran would alter the balance of power in the Persian
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Gulf to the benefit of Iraq; and Saddam Hussein’s ambition to emerge as the 
leading figure in the Arab world and to render Iraq the hegemonic force in the 
Gulf as the Shah had been in the 1970s.' ^  Saddam was also encouraged by 
Iran’s failure to end the hostage crisis and the antagonism this had created 
between Iran and the United States, by the economic and military sanctions 
imposed upon Iran by Washington, and by Iran’s international isolation. But 
the results of the invasion proved to be contradictory to the intentions of Iraqi 
leadership. It provided the Islamic government with a new source of life; the 
whole country gathered behind Khomeini; a passion of Shi’ism together with 
deep Iranian nationalism gratified the armed forces. The fundamentalists 
found another opportunity to deepen their anti-American rhetoric. True, the 
war intensified the struggle between the fundamentalists and Bani-Sadr, as 
foreseen by Hussein, but to the detriment of the latter. Saddam Hussein 
seemed to be unaware of the history of revolutions which dictates that external 
aggression contributes to consolidation of revolutions and to the dominion of 
radical elements.
After the Iranian Revolution, and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the main 
policy objectives of the United States in the Persian Gulf were to keep the 
Soviet Union out of the Persian Gulf, to contain the Islamic revolution and to 
assure the free How of Gulf oil to the Western world." In order to achieve 
these goals, two countries became important for Washington: the United States 
first sought to strengthen Saudi Arabia and to establish a regional security 
structure to contain Iran. Right after the outbreak of the war, the United States
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sent two AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia and continued to militarize the 
country in the course of the Iran-Iraq war. Secondly, the strategy of 
containing Iran drove Washington closer to Iraq which at that time had no 
formal relations with the United States and was still in State Department’s list 
of “state sponsors of terrorism”. So, even before the outbreak of the war, there 
occurred improvements in the informal relations between Washington and 
Baghdad. But the United States would not let Iraq become the hegemonic 
force in the region as Saddam had so ambitiously hoped. Washington’s 
strategy was to allow him to get just strong enough to contain the Islamic 
Revolution. During the Iran-Iraq war, Washington’s objective was indeed to 
watch the mutual destruction of the belligerents and to prevent any one of 
them to emerge as victorious or in other words, to maintain that there would be 
two losers in one war.
The war left the United States with a difficult dilemma and Washington 
preferred to tilt toward Iraq, although it formally demonstrated its neutrality 
and refused to sell arms to either belligerent. But America was giving 
nonmilitary aid to Iraq. America did not want Iran to come out as the victor, 
because this would allow Khomeini to control the world’s main oil fields. In 
addition, the United States was trying to contain the spread of radical Islam 
and to prevent the expansion of war. At the same time, Washington did not 
want to drive Iran closer to the Soviet bloc either. In January 1980, President 
Carter announced that the United State would fight any ‘outside force’ trying 
to control the Gulf ‘by any means necessary, including military force’. The
statement, known as the Carter Doctrine, signaled to the Soviet Union the 
eagerness of the United States to use force in the Gulf in case its vital interests 
were threatened?" The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, 
reminded Washington of the reality of a Soviet threat to Iran and the Gulf 
This might mean a possible cutoff of Gulf oil which would be devastating for 
the United States and other Western industrial powers that had become 
dependent on the energy resources of the Gulf When the Carter Doctrine was 
declared, America did not have a military unit, but only a conception of 
defense. But in January 1983, during Reagan’s presidency, Washington 
established the United States Central Command, a unified regional 
command. What was initially a unilateral declaration, came to be an 
American deterrent force in effect, that was to help local defense efforts 
primarily against a regional threat rather than a Soviet one.
The first UN resolution, passed in September 1980, called for a cease-fire but 
did not identify Iraq as the aggressor, nor demanded the return to the 
established pre-war borders. So, the resolution was rejected by Iran for good 
reason. Saddam Hussein also rejected it, as he was expecting an easy victory. 
After the first military attack by the Iraqi armed forces, a military stalemate 
continued until the summer of 1981. In that period, Iraq seemed to have the 
upper hand. Only within two years, could Iran mobilize its forces effectively. 
From September 1981 through May 1982. Iran performed three significant 
military offensives and forced Iraq to withdraw to the pre-war border in most 
places. At such a juncture, Iran had a valuable opportunity to end the war
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to the US and its allies that Iran would not let any country export its oil in the
Gulf if Iran itself could not.26
4.5. The Irangate Scandal
Shortly after the outbreak of the Iran-lraq war, an unacknowledged 
collaboration began between Israel and Iran. Indeed, the Israelis welcomed the 
war for security reasons as it would keep the Iraqi forces engaged and would 
replace the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a focus of attention. Some Israelis 
who were involved in arms sales, informed the Iranian authorities that they 
could sell arms to Iran. Khomeini decided to purchase Israeli arms as long as 
it was assured that the actual sellers would not be Israelis.T hus, Iran, in a 
sense was able to break the arms embargo of United States. In 1985, the 
Israelis managed to get the US government involved in its ongoing arms sales 
to Iran. This covert operation lasted three years and it involved illegal arms 
sales to Iran, and negotiations for tlie release of the US hostages in Lebanon 
held by the Lebanese Shi’ites. Reagan and his administration were attracted 
by the plan because the Israelis made them believe that their contacts with 
some pro-Western, anti-Khomeini elements within the Iranian regime might 
be to the benefit of the American government, fhere were also other factors 
that affected the decision of Washington. Iran could in many respects be 
considered as the major power in the Gulf and some important members of the 
Reagan administration believed that America’s long-term interests in the
region required the establishment of connection with Iran.28
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According to the Reagan administration, the operation was a result of the US 
government’s will “to establish contact with moderate elements within and 
outside the government of Iran...in order to enhance the credibility of these 
elements in their effort to achieve a more prp-US government in Iran...”.^ ^
The issue did not only involve arms sales to Iran but it also involved the 
transfer to the Contras in Nicaragua of profits from the sale of weapons to 
Iran. On this unusual occasion, a Third World country deluded a superpower 
through manipulation and deception. According to Mansour Farhang, it was 
no one but Khomeini himself that supervised the secret purchase of arms from 
W ashington.And the real objective behind the US sale of arms to Iran 
seems to be a deal for the release of US hostages in Lebanon, although it was 
denied by Reagan.
Whatever the reasons were, this secret operation was a disaster both for the 
Reagan administration and for Iranian-American relations. The scandal 
decreased the reliability of Reagan administration both domestically and 
internationally. In order to calm down domestic critics, the government began 
an aggressive anti-Iran policy. The scandal once again revealed that 
Washington was far from realizing the intense connection between domestic 
politics and foreign policy in Iran. Khomeini was once described as being 
irrational and a fanatic, and the possibility of a resolute, logical foreign policy 
for Iran seems to have been disregarded by Washington.
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In early 1987, the Iranian policy of the United States was in a complete 
disorder. The covert US arms sale to Iran was made public in November of 
1986. The United Stales’ credibility in the eyes of the Arab Gulf states fell 
considerably. The United States now had two foreign policy questions related 
with the Middle East. The first one was about what kind of a course the 
Iranian-American relations would follow in the wake of the scandal. The 
second question involved the restoration of confidence among the friendly 
Arab governments of the Persian Gulf Secretary of State George Shultz 
answered the first question in a statement. He declared that the United States 
recognized the Iranian revolution, which meant that they would not attempt to 
overthrow it. Conversely, the US government would seek to establish contacts 
through normal diplomatic channels. In the same statement he also sent 
signals to the Arabs saying that the United States would be firm against Iran 
on issues of terrorism and security. Although the Iranian government did not 
send a direct reply to Schultz’ statement, Hashemi Rafsanjani, a few weeks 
later announced that the relations with the United States did not need to be cut 
forever if the US did not plan any mischief The second problem of regaining 
Arab confidence was more complex and the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in 
late 1986 may be considei cd to be related. The tanker war entered into a new 
phase when Kuwait asked for the support of both superpowers to protect its 
ships from Iranian attack. The United States sent a positive response but did 
not offer to provide naval protection; in contrast, the Soviet Union offered full 
cooperation immediately. When the US administration learnt about the Soviet 
response, it declared its willingness to rellag all eleven Kuwaiti tankers and to
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provide them with naval protection, which the Soviet Union would not be able 
to offer. With the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in March 1987, the United 
States became directly involved in the Iran-lraq war on the side of Iraq. 
Although Iraq was attacking more ships than Iran, Washington was only 
condemning Tehran for making navigation in the Gulf very dangerous.
In January 1987, Iran launched its largest and most carefully planned 
offensive. Operation Karbala V. In March 1987, the United States government 
was informed that the continuation of the war could lead to an Iranian
T O
breakthrough that might impair the strategic interests of the United States.
In the same year, a congressional report concluded that Iraq could lose against 
Iran. Thus, the United States initiated some diplomatic efforts. In early 1987, 
there were meetings between Saddam Hussein and US officials. Hussein was 
promised that the United States would work in the UN Security Council for a 
resolution whose terms would be supposedly unacceptable to Iran. Iraq would 
accept the resolution and Iran would probably reject it, and enforcement 
measures such as an international arms embargo would be imposed on Iran.^ "* 
But 6 days after this meeting, Iraqi missiles hit the USS Stark in the Persian 
Gulf and killed 37 US sailors, yet President Reagen blamed Iran. The 
reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers coincided with this event and with the Karbala V 
offensive of Iran, Amei ica virtually became directly involved in the war after 
suffering an attack coming from Iraq, although unintentional. Contrary to 
Iranian leaders’ expectations and US worries, the Iranian offensive failed to 
achieve a breakthrough and the Iranian leaders were discussing whether a new
.S6
offensive the following year would change anything. ' They were also aware 
of the fact that the Iranian j:)eople had become exhausted by the ongoing war.
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In July 1987, UN Resolution 598 was adopted unanimously by the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, d'he resolution called for the 
ending of hostilities, but as planned beforehand by the United States through 
consultation with Iraqi oflicials, it did not determine the aggressor, nor did it 
mention war reparations to Iran; these were the two main conditions of Iran for 
peace. Americans were aiming to further isolate Iran and gather support for a 
worldwide arms embargo against Iran. But Iran, correctly reading the US 
design, neither approved nor rejected the resolution and prevented the 
imposition of an arms embargo. Accordingly, Iran asked for more time to 
study the resolution and offered to observe a cease-fire if a commission was 
formed to determine who initiated the war. in accordance with paragraph six 
of the resolution. Iraq rejected the Iranian offer as invalid and carried on full- 
scale attacks on Iranian cities and ships. Instead of evaluating the signals 
coming from Tehran, the United States devoted its efforts to attain an arms 
embargo against Iran.
The US Navy was quick to destroy the small Iranian Navy in the Gulf 
Hopelessly, Iran began to mine the Persian Gulf, but it was a miscalculated 
decision. International public opinion was alarmed; Iran’s diplomatic efforts 
to win support for its position was damaged seriously. In the meantime, Iraq 
gained the upper hand in war. And anti-war sentiment began to be openly
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demonstrated in the major cities of'lran and more disturbingly for the Iranian 
leadership, it was now known that Khomeini was severely ill and virtually 
disabled. In July 1988, the USS Vincennes downed a commercial Iranian 
aircraft and killed all the 290 passengers and crew. Iran could not even gather 
sufficient support at the United Nations to condemn the US action. The 
isolation and weakness of Iran was more than apparent. Militarily confronting 
serious attacks from the United States and Iraq, and internationally isolated, 
Iran accepted the UN resolution on July 18, 1988.
It was concluded in early 1987 by the Iranian leadership that they could not be 
the winners of this war, so the following events can be considered as domestic 
discussion in Iran about how to withdraw. The moves of Iran suggested that 
there was a willingness to reach a settlement. On the other hand, the radical 
factions in Iran wanted the continuation of war for ideological reasons or for 
their own interests. Seen from this standpoint, the actions of external actors 
become important as they cither encourage or hamper the peacemaking 
process. The impact of the United Slates is not all clear. Its insistent attempts 
on punishing Iran, first by drafting the UN resolution in away supposedly 
unacceptable to Iran, then persistently trying to achieve an arms embargo in 
spite of the Iranian efforts for achieving a compromise settlement, probably 
contributed to the prolongation olThc wai'. I'he United States ignored the 
possibilities of an agreement and thus strengthened the arguments of the 
radicals in Iran.
CHAPTER 5: US-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-KHOMEINI 
AND POST-COLD WAR ERA
5.1. Post-Khomeini Iran
Since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has experienced dramatic changes in its regional and global environment. 
The Kuwait crisis of 1991, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the Cold War created a new strategic environment that required an overall 
rethinking of Iran’s foreign policy norms of conduct. The Iranian policy 
agenda was further complicated by the pressure of the need for urgent postwar 
reconstruction. The death of Khomeini led to the emergence of dual 
leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamanei and President Ali Akbar Hashemi- 
Rafsanjani. President Rafsanjani took the upper hand in devising Iran’s foreign 
policy. He started an economic opening and managed to achieve an economic 
arrangement with the majority of Western nations. In the two regional crisis 
brought about by the Iraqi attempt at expansion and Soviet dissolution, 
Rafsanjani’s Iran demonstrated to the world its stability and maturity. As a 
result, the international image of Iran began to improve slowly and steadily. 
The depiction of pariah state attributed to the Khomeini era was undergoing a 
transformation due to the desired image of the post-Khomeini Iran as a norm- 
abiding state.
Before elaborating on the foreign policy of Iran and Iranian-American 
relations in the post-Khomeini era, it is appropriate to look at the dynamics of
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Iran’s foreign policy. In the analysis of Iran’s foreign policy, the role and 
weight of Islamic beliefs in determining the conduct of foreign policy has been 
a general issue of argument. But, in order not to fall into the trap of cultural 
reductionism, we should acknowledge that in any relation between Iran and 
another country, not only ideological interests and concerns, but also 
geopolitical and strategic considerations are taken into account. The Islamic 
ideology of Iran and its national interests are not necessarily in contradiction.' 
There can be a functional relationship between Islamic ideology and Iran’s 
national interests. The US-Iran arms deal revealed among other things that the 
Iranian regime was capable of pursuing the national interests of the state 
despite having an Islamic ideology.^ In post-Khomeini Iran, the political 
leadership made a pragmatic turn in foreign policy due to the dictates ol Iran’s 
national interests. Rather than a reorientation of the regime, this turn reflected 
an adjustment to the changing environment and to changing priorities of Iran.
The institutions and norms that the Iranian state has been using to reproduce 
itself after the Islamic revolution were predominantly religious in character. 
Also in the external self-expression of the regime, religion played a 
determining role. In post-revolutionary Iran, Islamic revolutionism and 
national state-building were both operative. In the international arena, 
nationalist concerns and Islamic extraterritorial impulses together were the 
motivating forces of state behavior. The ‘irrationality’ that was attributed to 
some foreign policy actions of Iran can to an extent be explained by the 
intermingled priorities of state institutionalization on the one hand, and the
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Islamic revolution on the other. The interests of revolutionism and national 
state-building were fused in the Islamic constitution. The religio-political elite 
had a negative perception of nationalism as a Western-imported ideology. The 
acceptance of the UN resolution 598 that ended the Iran-Iraq war was maybe 
the greatest concession of Khomeini to the reasoning of national state­
building.
Many observers of Iran were expecting that a crisis over political power would 
take place in Iran after the death of Khomeini.^ But the power vacuum in Iran 
was filled by the Iranian leadership without causing a crisis. Ayatollah 
Khamanei was elected as the new spiritual leader of Iran and Rafsanjani 
emerged as the chief executive of the country. Immense problems were 
awaiting him as a result of an unfinished revolution at home and war lost. The 
war had weakened the Iranian economy and destroyed the infrastructure, so 
domestically, a reconstruction of the economy was essential. In foreign affairs, 
Rafsanjani wanted to end the costly isolation of Iran. He pursued a careful 
rapproachment with the Western states and sought to improve Iran’s relations 
with its neighbors.
Under Rafsanjani, the Islamic tone of Iranian foreign policy subsided and a 
more pragmatic foreign policy course began to emerge. Iran had seen that the 
export of revolution was not feasible and its economic and national interests 
required a rapproachment with the West."^  After his election to presidency, 
Rafsanjani has frequently declared that Iran must “stop making enemies”.
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Iran’s relations with Russia has improved subsequently. Despite 
Washington’s opposition, Iran has become one of the most important 
purchasers of Russian arms. According to Professor Ramazani, the foreign 
policy slogan of the Khomeini era, “neither East nor West” was being 
surpassed in theory and practice of Iranian foreign policy by a new position 
that may be called “Both North and South’’^  in reference to Iran’s emerging 
interests and goals in North-Transcaucasia and Central Asia-and in the South- 
the Persian Gulf On the other hand, the new Iranian leadership insists that the 
tenet ‘neither East nor West’ does not mean having no relations with either 
East or West; it rather means that Iran will not permit ‘neither Eastern nor 
Western domination’.^  Iran’s relations with the European Community have 
also improved, although Khomeini’s fatva to kill Salman Rushdie had created 
tension. Iran’s trade with France increased six times between 1991 and 1993 
and its trade with Britain rose above $1 billion in 1992. And Germany 
continued to be the major trade partner of Iran.
In the postwar period, regional security in the Persian Gulf became quite 
important for Iran because domestic reconstruction of the country required 
regional stability. In addition, the turn to normalcy in the Gulf meant that 
there would be less need for Western military presence in the region. In the 
short-run, Iran had two major goals in the Gulf: containment of Iraq and 
reconciliation with the members of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.
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Worsening of Iraqi-Western relations in 1990 has been a major impediment 
for Iranian attempts to bring stability back to the Persian Gulf region.*
5.2. The Kuwaiti Crisis and Afterwards
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf War of January-February 1991 
provided Iran with a clear opportunity to improve its relations with its 
neighbors and more importantly, to reveal its stabilizing influence in the 
region.'  ^ The Kuwaiti crisis proved that the Iranian attempts to reduce tensions 
in the region were not tactical. Iran was the first country in the Persian Gulf to 
demand the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Kuwait posed a serious threat to vital interests of Iran because Iraq 
would thus acquire 20% of the world’s oil reserves and would maintain access 
to Kuwait’s Persian Gulf ports.’® Moreover, at the time of the Kuwaiti 
invasion, the Iraqi troops were still in occupation of Iranian territory. Thus, 
Iran was also confronted with prospects of territorial losses and a definite shift 
in the regional balance of forces. When American troops were deployed in the 
region with the decision of President George Bush, the Iranian administration 
opposed it, but the fundamental policy of Iran was clear: It asked for 
unconditional Iraqi withdrawal. In contrast to the warnings of some alarmists, 
Iran did not break the trade embargo against Iraq that the United Nations 
decreed."
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Throughout the crisis, the United States was the main concern of Iranian 
leaders. During the crisis, it became clear that the United States and Iran had 
many common goals. Both were against Iraqi annexation of Kuwait; both 
wanted to see a militarily-weakened Iraq; both opposed any change in the map 
of the region; both advocated the UN trade embargoes against Iraq and both 
objected to fragmentation of Iraq. Mindful of the so many shared goals with 
the United States, Iran did not antagonize the United States during the crisis 
and stayed neutral. Although Rafsanjani steadily condemned the military 
presence of the United States in the Gulf, he also stated that the military 
buildup might be tolerated if it served a positive end, and unless the US tried 
to turn its presence in Saudi Arabia into a permanent one. The long-term 
objective of Iran was unfreezing of its assets in the United States and to 
prevent the permanent presence of the United States in the region.
The neutrality of Iran and shared goals during the Kuwait crisis brought a 
certain degree of betterment in Iranian-American relations. Domestic 
considerations in Iran prevented the prospect of direct talks between 
Washington and Tehran, so the United States had to approach Iran through 
intermediaries such as Syria and Turkey. In September 1990, Washington 
paid the Iranian government $200 million for undelivered weapons that the 
Shah had purchased. In December 1990, US oil companies were authorized 
by President Bush to import 200.000 barrels of Iranian oil. Iran requested 
foreign loans from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Japan, 
and did not counter an objection from Washington. The Secretary of State,
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James Baker, declared that Iran was abiding by the UN sanctions against Iraq 
and that Iran would play an important role in any future security arrangements 
in the region.’^  In February 1991, Rafsanjani offered a peace plan, 
demonstrating Iranian wish for peace in the region. During the crisis, Iran 
tried to prevent air war through behind-the -scenes diplomatic means and the 
ground war by behaving reasonably towards Hussein. All these attempts 
aimed at reducing the possibility of a future American military presence in the 
region in large sizes. The Iranian offer to mediate between Washington and 
Baghdad should be viewed as reflecting Rafsanjani’s desire to achieve normal 
relations with the United States and to emerge as a stabilizing force in the 
region.
Iran came out of the Kuwaiti crisis politically and economically more stable. 
Increased oil prices helped the worn out economy of Iran. Iran improved its 
ties with major international financial institutions and with the United Nations. 
Its international image has improved and led to improved relations with the 
West and with the Arab countries of the Gulf. The Gulf crisis assisted 
Rafsanjani’s attempts to readjust Iran’s foreign policy, but there were also 
limits for an overall success of his policies. Firstly, although Washington 
promised to cooperate in Persian Gulf security arrangements, no clear proposal 
came. Iran was urging for regional security arrangements that would be based 
solely on the Gulf states and would exclude outside powers .The  Iranian 
leaders thought this was the best order to serve Iranian interests; it would 
provide the means for containing Iraq, secure a dominant military role for Iran
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in the Gulf, keep back the United States or non-regional states from having a 
significant military presence in the Gulf But, both the regional states and the 
United States lost interest in security arrangements once the crisis was over. 
Right after the end of the war, the United States was concerned with the 
Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq and with the Arab-Israeli peace initiative 
during the subsequent months. The GCC states also agreed that the ideal 
security arrangement for the Persian Gulf was one that would be achieved by 
the littoral states; however, they did not trust either Iran or one another as the 
guardian of their interests.'^
Secondly, there took place an improvement in US-Iranian relations, but a 
dramatic change in attitudes was not the case. Because on both sides the 
combination of past hostilities and current frictions hampered the 
normalization of relations. In the United States, public opinion did not forget 
the American hostage taking in Tehran and in Lebanon and other acts of 
terrorism that were associated with Iran. In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, 
the size of Iranian military buildup worried the US administration. It was also 
concluded that Iran was engaged in developing a nuclear capability and 
Washingt on tried to discourage third countries from selling nuclear equipment 
to Iran. Other obstacles that prevented the United States to initiate further 
improvement in relations with Iran were Iranian attempts to coordinate 
opposition against Arab-Israeli peace talks, Iran’s human rights record, and 
Iranian support for radical Islamic groups in Sudan.
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In Iran, American hostility against the Islamic revolution created resentment 
towards that country. The United States was blamed to have encouraged Iraq 
for the invasion of Iran in September, 1980 and also for lending support to Iraq 
in the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranians did not easily forget the killing of 290 
passengers in 1989 when an Iranian civilian airbus was downed by the United 
States in the Persian Gulf America was also charged with blocking European 
investment in Iran; further, US resistance to the sale of nuclear arms and other 
technology to Iran and the perception that the United States prevented possible 
World Bank loans also embittered relations between the two countries. A 
third reason that prevented the full success of Rafsanjani’s attempts to readjust 
Iran’s foreign policy was that investment Iran had been expecting from the 
European countries and Japan did not materialize.
In the post-Cold war environment, and with the diminishing of Soviet threat, 
Tehran is willing to wield its authority in the region. It is apparent that the 
pursuit of national interest has the potential to bring Iran into direct 
confrontation with the Western-oriented GCC states and their Western 
supporters.'^’ After the defeat of Iraq, Iran’s re-emergence as the potential 
outstanding power in the Persian Gulf has marked Tehran’s uneasy relations 
with the United States. The US administration feared that the defeat of Iraq’s 
military power would open the way for Iran to reexert its dominance in the 
region.'^ By virtue of the size of its population and land area, its geostrategic 
position and its material resources, Iran has the potential to dominate the Gulf, 
but Iran is far from fully realizing this potential, because of the immense
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economic and social problems experieneed during the Iranian revolution and 
the eight-years war with Iraq.
5.3. Iranian-American Relations during the Presidency of Clinton
A survey of American relations with Iran from 1979 onward shows two 
apparently contradictory trends. On the legal and diplomatic front, the United 
States has always appeared more tough and restrictive toward Iran than on the 
economic front. The Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations have imposed a 
wide variety of executive and legislative constraints between 1979 and 1993, 
preventing most of the military and many of the eeonomic transactions 
between the two countries. Since the State Department’s placement of Iran on 
the list of supporters of terrorism in 1984, the export of major divisions of the 
dual-use technology have been banned. Since 1987, imports from Iran have 
been prohibited, except for a few items. The United States cut off diplomatic 
bilateral relations with Iran after the hostage talcing in 1979 and it is in a state
of national emergency vis-à-vis Iran. 18
However, US exports to Iran have steadily increased after 1989 from a zero 
level to $1 billion in 1993. US companies added $3.5 billion to the Iranian 
economy by purchasing Iranian oil and refining it outside the United States. 
Having inherited this dichotomy from previous administrations, the Clinton 
administration also had trouble in drawing a single course for American 
relations with Iran. In the post-Cold war environment, both the United States
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and Iran faced significant political dilemmas with respect to their relations 
with each other. On the one hand, Iran had significant economic problems and 
was in need of investment and technology for its domestic development which 
urged it to gain respectability abroad. This policy objective seemed to be 
conflicting with its ambition to expand its influence both in the Gulf and in the 
new republics on the n o r t h . O n  the other hand, the United States confronts a 
basic dilemma. While assisting Iran’s economic development would 
strengthen those supporting the pragmatist policies of Rafsanjani, it would 
also encourage Iran to challenge the US position in the Gulf and to acquire 
weapons that could radically change the balance in the region to its own 
advantage.
When the Clinton administration came to office, it declared the policy of dual 
containment with respect to its foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq. This 
policy arose from the judgment that both Iran and Iraq pursue policies 
fundamentally hostile to American interests. In opposition to its past record in 
the region, the United States was thus rejecting the policy of building one of 
these powers against the other, in favor of a policy to contain the hostile 
policies of both. Concerning Iran, the US administration specified five areas 
of disagreement: (1) disturbing acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran; (2) 
Iran’s sponsor of international terrorism and assassinations of its political 
enemies; (3) its hostile attitude toward the Arab-Israeli peace process; (4)
subversive activities against its neighbors; (5) violation of human rights.20
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On the economic dimension, the policy of containment of Iran involved an 
arms ban, a ban on dual use technologies, an entire import ban on Iranian 
products, controls on certain items for export to Iran, and a diplomatic position 
of blocking all credits to Iran from international financial institutions. In its 
attempt to contain Iran, the US government was trying to persuade Europe and 
Japan to help prevent Iran from acquiring weapons. It was argued that Iran 
should not be allowed to enjoy normal relations, particularly normal 
commercial relation, with the West as long as it continues to threaten Western 
interests. Dual containment would also require a rectified American military 
commitment in the Gulf with closer military engagements with such key 
powers as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In order not to appear overly harsh, the 
Clinton administration declared that it did not oppose the Islamic government 
in Iran but only specific aspects of the regime’s behavior and that the US 
policy did not seek a confrontation with Iran. Taking into account the 
difficulties and failures that have troubled the last three presidents, it is not 
surprising that the rhetoric of the Clinton administration’s policy toward Iran 
has been both harsh and conciliatory.
The policy of dual containment has created discussions among the government 
officials, Iranian and Middle East scholars and experts. Generally, the critics 
of American policy may be divided into two broad categories: those who 
believe that current policy exaggerates the Iranian threat and favor resumption 
of normal relations, and those who favor punishment and isolation and do not 
find US policies though enough. The analysts that may be placed in the first
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category emphasize the political and economic necessity of normalization of 
relations between Washington and Tehran, and they generally attach less 
importance to those negative aspects of Iran’s policies which are taken very 
seriously by the US government?^
Critics who regard American policies toward Iran to be harsh and not in the 
best interests of America and the international community argue that Iranian 
threat is exaggerated and that Iran’s behavior could change, so the United 
States should reconsider its confrontational policy against the Islamic 
Republic. Some of the arguments appear as answers, rebuttals to negative 
voices and some are inducements that are considered to bring mutual benefit to 
both the United States and Iran. In the realm of rebuttals, the advocates of 
rapproachment with Iran claim that not only the United States against Iran, but 
also Iran against the United States has valid grievances such as the downing of 
an Iranian airbus in the Gulf, killing 290 passengers. Iranian policy of arms 
acquisition is answered by stating that a country as large as Iran, located in not 
a very friendly environment is perfectly right to acquire arms proportionate to 
its defense needs. Moreover, Iran lost important amounts of weaponry during 
the Iran-Iraq war. The apologists also claim that Iran has a justified interest in 
the security of the Persian Gulf due to its geographical location and its 
population. Given the extent of American military presence there, Iranian 
attempts to acquire arms become more understandable. They also state that 
Iran has not been aggressive against any of its neighbors since the revolution;
further, it has been the victim of aggression 23
The critics that favor normalization of relations with Iran also put forward a 
number of inducements. Their main political argument is that any security 
arrangement in the Gulf would be imperfect if Iran is kept out. It is also 
claimed that Iran constitutes a natural barrier in case of a possible resurgence 
of Russian expansionism and that it would be wiser to strengthen Iran rather 
than weaken it. The supporters of normalization also mention that most of 
Iran’s neighbors (Pakistan, Turkey and most of the Gulf states) seek better 
relations with the Islamic Republic. They prefer the construction of economic 
and diplomatic relations rather than isolation. For these countries, Iran 
presents a significant trade potential. Besides, more contacts with Iran, 
through trade or other exchanges may be the most efficient way to force Iran 
to improve its imperfect human rights performance.
In contrast to those critics who favor normalization of relations with Iran, 
some critics believe the Clinton administration should even be tougher and go 
on to escalate the confrontation with Iran. They perceive the Islamic Republic 
to be determined to damage Western and US interests in the region, to pursue 
a nuclear weapons program, and to continue to resort to terrorism against its 
opponents at home and abroad. Iran is a revolutionary state seeking to export 
its regime and if insufficient countervailing Western pressure is imposed, the 
prospect of an Iranian hegemony would be high.^ "^  The Clinton 
administration, they argue, should not repeat the same mistake as the Bush 
administration; it should not miscalculate Iran as Iraq was underestimated
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before 1990. Iran is believed to manipulate Islamic fundamentalist 
movements in Egypt, Sudan and Algeria. Furthermore, Iran’s support of 
Palestinian militant organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas lead these 
critics to perceive a widely designed movement, aiming to seize power and 
establish Islamic oriented, anti-Western governments over a wide territory 
which would be under Tehran’s prevailing influence. Inside Iran, the Islamic 
government is recurrently pictured as engaging in violation of human rights by 
resorting to torture and execution of the regime’s political opponents, 
attacking privacy, treating ethnic or religious minorities inhumanely.
It seems that those who favor a tougher American policy toward Iran have 
prevailed within the government, for on April 30, 1995, President Clinton 
announced and on May 6, signed an executive order which reinforces and 
strengthens the already existing sanctions against Iran. The executive order 
bans all trade, trade financing , loans and financial services to Iran. The US 
companies are prohibited to purchase Iranian oil overseas, even if it is for 
resale overseas. No new investment of American companies are allowed in 
Iran. I hose goods and technologies which are on control lists for direct export 
from the United States to Iran are banned to be re-exported from third 
countries to Iran. The foreign subsidiaries of US companies are not affected 
by the executive order as it does not have extraterritorial application. Further, 
it does not ban the import of informational materials from Iran. And the order 
does not block Iranian assets or prevent private Iranian nationals from
acquiring or lending private remittances.25
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In his statement before the House International Relations Committee, Robert 
H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs explained 
that this action was chosen carefully to advance those strategic US interests 
that are perceived to have been challenged by Iran’s outlaw activities.^^ The 
main concerns of the US government were to prevent terrorism, advance the 
Arab-Israeli peace process, tight the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
maintain security in the Persian Gulf In these areas of concern, he stated, the 
US government found that Iranian behavior had worsened.
Given the government-stated objective of toughening relations with Iran, the 
question becomes whether the policy adopted offers a realistic prospect of its 
accomplishment and whether it brings more harm than good. First of all, the 
sanctions imposed on Iran are unilateral sanctions and they would not yield the 
intended objective unless supported by many other countries that maintain 
diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran. Presently, none of Iran’s major 
trading partners have expressed their willingness to join the embargo. This 
was not a surprise for the US government, because it knew beforehand that it 
would not be supported; it did not consult with any other government, nor did 
it raise the issue at the UN Security Council. The United States took the lead 
in an action in the full knowledge (and counting on) that it would not be 
followed by other states. Because, if Iran’s 2.6 million barrels daily export of 
oil is withdrawn from the world market, it would create chaos in oil markets
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and substantially increase the oil prices that might increase inflation in the
United States as well as in the world.27
The sanctions that are imposed by the United States on Iran become 
interesting considering that the US did not apply such heavy sanctions against 
the Soviet Union even at the peak of the Cold War. This disproportionality of 
the sanctions makes either the sincerity of the intentions and objectives of the 
US government or the magnitude of the threat posed by Iran questionable. 
After the announcement of the new sanctions, it was repeatedly declared by 
the US government that it accepted the Iranian revolution as a fact and was not 
aiming the overthrow it. However, Professor Gary Sick points out that such an 
objective -the overthrow of the existing regime- seems more consistent with
the US actions and with the strictness of the sanctions.28
One more flaw in the logic of the Clinton administration’s sanctioning Iran is 
that the sins of Iran, although real, are hardly the only examples in the Middle 
East as argued by an Iran specialist. Iran gives material and spiritual support 
to militants throughout the Islamic world which engage in terrorist activities, 
regularly condemns the Arab-Israeli peace process, and has a very poor human 
rights record. But in the Middle East context, these are not very uncommon 
ways of action. Syria and probably even Saudi Arabia strive with Iran in 
supplying financial support to largely Arab groups that are involved in the 
principal terrorist networks in the Middle East. Considering the struggle of the 
militant Islamic movements with the West, Iran does not appear as the
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undisputed leader. Before the emergence of Shi’i radicalism in Iran, Sunni 
radicalism was active in the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for 
instance, was opposing the Western-oriented policies of Nasser, long before 
Khomeini’s followers began to challenge the rule of the Shah. Iran has an awful 
human rights record, but America’s contemporary collaborators in the Middle 
East -Syrians and Saudis- do not have a much better one, either.
With the current policy, the Clinton administration has relied almost entirely on 
negative initiatives such as military deterrence, strict restrictions on technology 
transfers and blocking Iran’s demands for international economic assistance, to 
influence and change Iranian behavior. It has not presented any positive 
incentives for Iran to change its behavior. Thus, neither the scope, nor the 
composition of the sanctions of the United States seem consistent with the 
declared objective of forcing Iran to change its course of action. The whole policy 
needs reconsideration.
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The enmity between the United States and Iran is deep. Both countries have 
fundamentally different visions and remain suspicious of each other. The 
blame for this can be attributed to both sides. Iranian foreign policy, 
particularly after the revolution, presented fluctuations and inconsistencies, 
mainly as a result of the need to reconcile the prerequisites of its national 
interest and the ambitions of its Islamic ideology. When the agenda of one of 
them dominated the other, the Iranian leadership had to give prior 
consideration to that one, which gave the impression that of inconsistency and 
irrationality.
American failure in Iran was mainly a result of a single-minded strategy over 
political realities. It placed too much emphasis on seemingly unchanging 
factors, and relied on the strength of the status quo. America invested in the 
Shah and did not take into account the power of the seemingly powerless in 
Iran, i.e., the people. The United States preferred to conduct its relations 
through one man, the Shah, who depended solely on one force in the country, 
the army. The United States paid a high price in Iran for neglecting the 
cultural, social, economic, and religious considerations and the historical 
formations of the Iranians.
The Third World countries have totally different cultures, religious 
orientations and practices and histories than the Western countries. As yet, a
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
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general orientation of the American foreign policy is to remain insensitive to 
cultural and religious composition of the Third World countries. This 
insensitivity resulted from certain misleading assumptions, the primary one 
being that the Western model of development has universal applicability. This 
simplistic model disregards the fact that the domestic and international 
conditions under which the Western world became what it is were 
qualitatively different from those faced by the Third World countries.
Another misleading assumption was that economic growth would bring 
stability to any and all modernizing countries. However, as it has been proven 
by the Iranian revolution in 1979, it was even more important how this wealth 
was distributed. In addition, US foreign policy has almost completely 
dismissed religion as a relevant force in revolutionary movements, at least 
until the Islamic revolution in Iran. It was assumed that modernization and 
secularization complement each other. All these misleading assumptions 
prevented the United States governments to foresee the revolution in Iran and 
to recognize the power of religion and religious organization in Iran.
The mismanagement of relations with Iran also resulted from the fact that the 
United States had to engage in Middle East diplomacy suddenly after the end 
of World War II. It was a region in which the American government had little 
interest at that time and little expertise or experience.
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In Iran, domestic politics had a significant effect on foreign policy. The 
Iranian leadership generally did not hesitate to trouble its foreign relations to 
calm down a domestic unrest. Overall, Iran pursued an independent, 
nonalignment policy, but during the Shah period, this characteristic of Iran, 
and foreign policy was heavily flawed. That is also a reason of why the 
Iranian public resented the Shah’s overdependence on the United States. 
Hence, the anti-American virulence of the Islamic Republic can be seen in part 
as a legacy of the Shah’s unusually close ties with the United States.
After the establishment of an Islamic government in Iran in 1979, the United 
States and Iran began a campaign of mutual demonization. The United States 
resorted to very harsh measures but failed to bring about a significant change 
in the Iranian way of behavior. On the contrary, it intensified the 
consolidation of the power of the clergy. With the policy of containment of 
Iran, which was adopted after the presidency of Clinton, the Unites States 
repeated its fruitless efforts of isolating Iran but failed to do so mainly because 
it was all alone in its efforts. The US government could not convince Iran’s 
major trading partners to stop commercial relations with Iran.
Both the United States and Iran have justifiable grievances against each other, 
but the realities of the interdependent world prevents each side to completely 
disregard the other and also to effectively chastise the other. The prospects of 
an early dialogue are not very strong, but nonetheless, the United States may 
support the idea of some sort of constructive dialogue with Iran. But, given
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the current policy of the United States towards Iran, it is not very clear what it 
intents to do. The present policy does not seem to have a workable strategy 
for the achievement of those objectives which are declared to be the blueprint 
of US action in the Middle East. It rails against Iran’s behavior, but does not 
offer anything credible for changing it. The US government’s rhetoric towards 
Iran has become even more ideological and shrill than that of the ayatollahs, 
whom the US has from time to time called irrational and incapable of 
behaving normal. It has to cool the rhetoric for some time. And as far as the 
US government ignores the legitimate interests of its allies in Iran, and does 
not develop a strategy in cooperation with them, its unilateral policies are 
bound to fail. It is true, in the international arena Iran has attracted much 
reaction by disregarding international law, giving assistance to terrorist 
organizations. But the current policy of the United States may even make 
Iranian behavior worse in these areas, which would not be to the interest of not 
only the United States, but also the region and the whole international 
community.
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